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COMMENTS
THE THIRD DIMENSION OF DEDICATION IN LOUISIANA
The subject of dedication has been provocative of litigation
and commentary throughout the United States,' particularly in
Louisiana. 2 While the basic issues seem to have been solved in
Louisiana since 1938,3 the question remains whether resolution
of these issues has been dictated by some compelling logic
founded in the civil law system, or whether common law prin-
ciples have been wholly adopted as the law of Louisiana. This
Comment will examine the legitimacy of the heritage of dedica-
tion in Louisiana with particular emphasis on the nature of the
right created in the public. To gain an overall picture of the
important issues presented by recent cases, it is necessary to
review briefly the common law of dedication and the case of
Arkansas-Louisiana Gas Co. v. Parker Oil Co.4 With this review
in mind, the recent problems and the Parker case itself can then
be evaluated by comparison with the pertinent Louisiana juris-
prudence.
The Parker Case and the Common Law of Dedication
Dedication in other states is the setting apart of land for
public use,5 and it is either statutory or common-law." The
former operates by grant7 and conveys fee title8 of the land
1. There have been numerous law review articles dealing with the subject
of dedication. See, e.g., Notes, 8 BAYLOR L. REV. 87 (1956), 23 ILL. L. REV. 607
(1929); 37 IND. L.J. 554 (1962), 48 KY. L.J. 473 (1960), 11 MARQ. L. REV. 160
(1927), 46 N.C.L. REV. 663 (1968), 45 N.C.L. REV. 564 (1967); Comment, 53
CALIF. L. REV. 559 (1965). See also Freese, Subdivision Regulations and Com-
pulsory Dedications, 39 DICTA 299 (1962); Parks, The Law of Dedication in
Oregon, 20 ORE. L. REV. 111 (1941); Whatley, Common Law and Statutory
Dedications in Alabama, 17 ALA. LAw. 43 (1956).
2. See, e.g., Comments, 16 LA. L. REV. 789, 16 LA .L. REV. 521 (1956), 13 TUL.
L. REV. 606 (1939); Note, 16 LA. L. REV. 582 (1956). 7
3. At that time the Louisiana Supreme Court decided Arkansas-
Louisiana Gas Co. v. Parker Oil Co., 190 La. 957, 183 So. 229 (1938).
4. 190 La. 957, 183 So. 229 (1938).
5. 1 B. ELLIOTT, THE LAW OF ROADS AND STREETS § 122 (4th ed. 1926) [here-
inafter cited as ELuOTT, ROADS AND STREETS].
6. See 3 J. DILLON, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAw OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
§ 1071 (5th ed. 1911) [hereinafter cited as DILLON, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS];
ELLIOTT, ROADS AND STREETS § 122.
7. See DILLON, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 1071; ELLIOTT, ROADS AND STREETS
§ 125.
8. See note 7 supra. These authorities state that the fee title passes to
the public if required by an express provision or necessary implication in the
statute. The Louisiana statute neither expressly nor impliedly requires such
a result; however, this seems to be the unquestioned result in the juris-
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dedicated without necessity of acceptance,9 while the latter op-
erates by way of estoppel in pais'0 and conveys only an ease-
ment which must be accepted either expressly or impliedly by
public use.'
Common-law dedication may be further categorized as either
express or implied, depending upon the extent of the land-
owner's manifestation of intent to dedicate.12 However accom-
plished, an easement is conveyed to the public. An express
common-law dedication involves some affirmative, unequivocal
act by the landowner evidencing an intent to dedicate. The
typical example of this type is recordation of a plat showing
streets, alleys, or squares when no statute is applicable.' s An
implied common-law dedication arises from lesser manifesta-
tions of intent to dedicate including silence and acquiescence in
the public's use.14
When property is dedicated to public use, the state or nation
does not hold it for private purposes, but for purely public pur-
prudence. The statute on abandonment by the public of dedicated lands is
necessarily applicable only to situations where full ownership is in the pub-
lic. This seems to lend some support to the argument that the public
acquires full title by a statutory dedication. See LA. R.S. 33:5051 (1962) and
id. 48:701.
9. See DILLON, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 1071; ELLIOTT, ROADS AND STREETS-
§ 125.
10. See DILLON, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §§ 1070-1071; ELLIOTT, ROADS AND
STREETS § 125. Contra, 2 H. TIFFANY, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 484 (2d ed.
1920) [hereinafter cited as TIFFANY, PROPERTY]. The latter author states that
dedication antedates estoppel and is based on the principle that, for legal
purposes, one's intention is such as his acts would lead a reasonable man to
believe to be his Intention. This seems to be a chicken-or-the-egg problem
since estoppel is essentially a method of achieving equity when a situation
cannot be fitted into a particular legal form, such as contract, gift, or sale.
Both "theories" are based on the ancient principle of Roman law that one
should not disappoint expectations which he has created. See DeArmas v.
Mayor and City of New Orleans, 5 La. 132 (1833) (dissenting opinion).
11. See DILLON, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 1071; ELLIOTT, ROADS AND STREETS
§ 125.
12. See DILLON, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 1079; ELLIOTT, ROADS AND STREETS
§§ 133-134.
13. See note 12 supra. These are the authorities most often cited by
Louisiana courts when discussing dedication in this particular fact situation.
Often the cases conclude that perfect title to the dedicated land is in the
public while these authorities deal with express common-law dedication creat-
ing only an easement or servitude.
See DILLON, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 1083. This oft-quoted passage em-
phasizes that this factual situation is handled as an express common-law
dedication since it creates only private contractual rights by estoppel until
accepted by the public.
14. See DILLON, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 1079; ELLIOTr, ROADS AND STREETS
§§ 133-134.
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poses. 15 It is not necessary that there be any particular grantee
to take the fee title16 when conveyed, since generally the ordi-
nary rules of law relating to private rights have been modified,
relaxed, and molded by public convenience and necessity. 17
In 1938, the Louisiana Supreme Court, in Arkansas-Louisiana
Gas Co. v. Parker Oil Co.' explicitly outlined the rules of law
applying to dedication in Louisiana. The court's opinion, while
based partly on past decisions, appears to be a complete adoption
of the common law of dedication.19 While duplicating the general
requirements of statutory and common-law dedications, as dis-
cussed above, the court emphasized that these were the only
two types of dedication in Louisiana. 20 The court referred to
"implied, common-law dedication" (informal),21 but apparent-
ly, the concept of express common law dedication (formal) was
not considered. The court by omitting discussion of this third
type of dedication conveniently seemed to ignore the Louisiana
jurisprudence, as will be examined below.
The question of a third dimension in the Louisiana law of
dedication was raised specifically in 1967, when the Louisiana
Supreme Court gave its approval to Banta v. Federal Land Bank
of New Orleans22 by denying certiorari, and thus reopened for
consideration the bulk of Louisiana jurisprudence concerning
dedication. In Banta the original landowner had divided his
land into large tracts of 40 to 100 acres and had filed a plat of
the area describing the roads thereon as "public roads." The
court stated that Louisiana jurisprudence recognizes that sub-
15. ELLIOTT, ROADS AND STREETS § 150; TIFFANY, PROPERTY § 486. Accord,
1 A. YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW OF PROPERTY § 30 (1966).
16. ELLIOTT, ROADS AND STREETS § 162. Accord, Johnston v. City of New
Orleans, 234 La. 697, 101 So.2d 206 (1958).
17. DILLON, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 1107; ELLOTr, ROADS AND STREETS
§ 186. This is consistent with the interrelationship of estoppel with common-
law dedication. See note 11 supra. It is interesting to note that the common
law writers apparently feel that the Louisiana system is different, see DILLON,
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 1105.
18. 190 La. 957, 183 So. 229 (1938).
19. see DILLON, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §§ 1070-1107; ELLIOTT, ROADS AND
STREETS §§ 122-186; TIFFANY, PROPERTY §§ 480486. See generally 26 C.J.S. Dedi-
cation (1956); 23 AM. JUR. Dedication (1965) and the authorities cited there.
20. See generally Comments, 16 LA. L. Rsv. 521 (1956), 13 TUL. L. REV.
606 (1939).
21. The words "implied" and "common-law" were treated as interchange-
able terms rather than independent, restrictive modifiers of the word "dedi-
cation."




division of lands prior to Act 134 of 189623 (the basis for statutory
dedication in Louisiana), followed by a sale of lots, constitutes
a dedication.2 4 Furthermore, this rule has been applied after
1896 when Act 134 of 1896 was not complied with or not men-
tioned.25 The court pointed out that Parker, for the first time,
announced that a declaration may be either statutory or common-
law, and that it implicitly, if not directly, held that a dedication
not in substantial compliance with Act 134 of 1896 amounted
to an implied common-law dedication conveying only a servitude
to the public. However, the court felt that the Louisiana Su-
preme Court had since recognized, in Parish of Jefferson v.
Doody,26 that aside from compliance with Act 134 of 1896, there
is an implicit intention in the filing of a plat to dedicate streets.
Since the present case involved large lots, the court correctly
determined that Act 134 of 1896 was not intended to apply;
however, the plat contained words of dedication and expressed
an intention to dedicate. The court concluded that the inapplica-
bility of Act 134 of 1896 does not preclude other forms of dedi-
cation, such as filing a plat which results in an "informal"'
dedication which needs no acceptance to convey title in the
dedicated lands to the public.
Whether Banta is correct depends upon its allusion to older
cases and the effect of Parker upon these cases, but it seems
clear that Banta has created or clearly revived a third form of
dedication in Louisiana. While one case in the sea of Louisiana
jurisprudence on dedication might easily escape attention, it is
rather amazing that the implication of Banta can go unnoticed
by the courts and writers. 28 What is even more beguiling is that
23. Superseded by LA. R.S. 33:5051 (1962).
24. The court cited what appear to be appropriate cases for this proposi-
tion. Richard v. City of New Orleans, 195 La. 898, 197 So. 594 (1940); Jaenke
v. Taylor, 160 La. 109, 106 So. 711 (1926); Town of Vinton v. Lyons, 131 La.
673, 60 So. 54 (1912); Flournoy v. Breard, 116 La. 224, 40 So. 684 (1906); Kemp
v. Town of Independence, 156 So. 56 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1934); Faunce v. City
of New Orleans, 148 So. 57 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1933).
25. For this proposition the court cited Iseringhausen v. Larcade, 147
La. 515, 85 So. 224 (1920); Esposito v. Gaudet, 8 So.2d 783 (La. App. Orl. Cir.
1942). It is true that dedications were found in these cases, but it is not at
all certain what type of dedications were involved: implied common-law or
express dedications not covered by La. Acts 1896, No. 134.
26. 247 La. 839, 174 So.2d 798 (1965). The court in this case, however,
found a statutory dedication, although they cited common law authority
which involved express, common-law dedications. See DILLON, MUNICIPAL COR-
PORATIONS § 1079.
27. The terminology is somewhat confusing since the dedication involved
was formal, but not in compliance with LA. R.S. 33:5051 (1962).
28. For a scant discussion of the case on a wholly unrelated issue, see
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the same court, later in the same year, relied on Parker in stating
that there were only two forms of dedication in Louisiana-
statutory and common-law.2'
A recent case, Chevron Oil Co. v. Wilson,s° makes inquiry
into the types of dedication recognized in Louisiana even more
desirable. In Chevron, a road had come into use through the
sufferance of the landowner who later subdivided, surveyed,
and filed a plat of his subdivision. The plat only acknowledged
the existence of the highway by a notation of an "improved
highway." The State of Louisiana claimed ownership through a
statutory dedication. The landowner claimed that only a servi-
tude had been created by an implied dedication. The court, rely-
ing on Parker, concluded that the facts presented amounted to
a statutory dedication. The court was not impressed by the fact
that the highway antedated the plat, since, it asserted, Louisiana
courts have held that whenever a plat is recorded, ownership
passes to the public.81 Intention to dedicate was found from the
platting, recording, and selling of lots according to the plat. It
is at least questionable whether a pre-existing highway is cov-
ered by the terms of R.S. 33:5051 which involves real estate laid
out by the landowner into squares or lots intersected by streets.
The phantom jurisprudence to which the court alluded does
not concern statutory dedication but an old, obscure type of
formal dedication (not covered by the statute) which was "re-
vived," perhaps unintentionally, by Banta. Assuming then that
R.S. 33:5051 is not really applicable because of the existence of
the highway before recordation of the plat, can the Chevron
case be sustained on another theory? More specifically, is the
formal non-statutory dedication discussed in Banta a reality in
our jurisprudence? If so, what types of dedication exist in Lou-
isiana today, and what interests are created in the public-per-
fect ownership or servitude?
The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courta for the 1967-1968 Term-Prop-
erty, 29 LA. L. Rrv. 185, 190 (1969).
29. Village of Folsom v. Alford, 204 So.2d 100 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1967).
This is one of the more emphatic endorsements of the Parker rule in the
entire Louisiana jurisprudence.
30. 226 So.2d 774 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 227 8o.2d 593 (La.
1969).
31. This is quite a broad statement of law given without reference to any
particular cases. Such a generality would seem to be improper even under
the implication in Banta that a third type of dedication exists In these situ-
ations. The court attempted to factually distinguish the decision of Wilson
Motor Co. v. McDonald, 69 So.2d 91 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1953), although it seems
that intention to dedicate is no greater here than in McDonald.
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The Common Law Assault on Perfect Ownership of Public
Things
The Louisiana jurisprudence concerning dedication has
evolved through various periods of confusion and erosion by the
common law in its century and a half. Some of the recognizable
periods are: the Louisiana civilian period; the period of Civil
Code influence; the post-1896 period; and finally, the post-
Parker period. Throughout this entire history it is apparent that
the most serious sources of confusion are attempts by the courts
to adopt some of the language and principles of the common
law.82
Two of the earliest cases concerning the public interest in
dedicated land were Mayor and City of New Orleans v. Met-
zingers and Chabot v. Blanc.3 4 Both cases involved the original
plan, in 1728, of the City of New Orleans which showed a "com-
mon" between Front Street and the river. The issue was whether
the governor of Louisiana could divest the land of its public
character by a subsequent grant of a lot to the defendant. Al-
though the court indicated a desire to deny the sovereign's
power to alter the public status of the land, the plaintiff failed
to show that the lot encroached on public ground. However, of
importance is the court's recognition of the public's title in the
land according to the civilian principle that "public things"
belong to the public.8 Renthrop v. Bourg,36 decided in 1816, re-
jected the influences of common law principles of dedication and
held that the Roman law declaring the soil of a highway to be
public property was in force in Louisiana. The issue over which
the court disagreed was whether the sovereign necessarily re-
serves ownership of the soil of a highway when it grants land
32. In the ensuing discussion the word "dedication," unless a particular
type is specified, denotes the general, ambiguous concept of dedication which
the courts gradually came to avoid defining and characterizing.
33. 3 Mart.(O.S.) 296 (La. 1814).
34. 5 Mart.(O.S.) 328 (La. 1818).
35. Actually the idea that the public character of things Is tantamount
to public ownership of them is a Louisiana version of purely civilian princi-
ples. By statute, the Louisiana legislature has defined a great part of the
public things in Louisiana as owned by the state. Thus, public things are
automatically thought of as being owned by the public.
Under purely civilian principles the public character of a thing is not
determinative of ownership but simply denotes that the thing is "out of
commerce" and "not subject to private ownership." A thing may be owned
by no one, as common things; or the public may have only a right to the
use of the thing; or the public may actually own the thing. See generally
1 A. YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 12, 24, 30 (1966).
36. 4 Mart.(O.S.) 97 (La. 1816).
[VEOL. 30
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to an individual; however, the entire court agreed that normally
the public does own these lands.37 An authoritative decision
recognizing public ownership of dedicated land is Mayor and
City of New Orleans v. Gravier.38 The court recognized as au-
thority an 18th century Spanish case which involved the present
defendant and intervenor and held that the same square pres-
ently disputed was effectively dedicated by the platting of a
subdivision followed by a sale of lots with reference to the plan.
With the above cases as authority, the Louisiana courts
should have had little trouble adhering to the Louisiana rule
that the public has perfect ownership of all public places,
whether acquired by dedication or conventional forms of transfer.
However, the United States Supreme Court in 1832, in City of
Cincinnati v. White's Lessee,89 endorsed the theory of dedica-
tion by estoppel. While the reasoning of the case was not ob-
jectionable, the Supreme Court avoided deciding whether the
public acquired full ownership of dedicated lands or merely an
easement, although it made implications in both directions.40
The eventual result in Louisiana was confusion. The effect of
the Cincinnati case was at first rejected in DeArmas v. Mayor
and City of New Orleans.41 While this case is sometimes cited
as the demise of the civil law doctrine of public things and dedi-
cation,42 the case actually stood only for the proposition that
although a city may derive title to public places from individuals
under the Spanish law, the sovereign had overriding power to
dispose of the land as he pleased.
48
37. Public ownership of public things is the established principle In Lou-
isiana civil law. see note 35 supra.
38. 11 Mart.(O.S.) 620 (La. 1822).
39. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 431 (1832).
40. On subsidiary issues, such as whether a grantee was necessary to
accept a dedication, the Court mentions cases concerning dedications result-
ing in the conveyance of easements to the public. Subsequently, the Court
says that the facts were so positive and conclusive in this case that a jury
might have found a grant to the public. The Court concluded that should It
be admitted that the landowner retained the fee title, still the city must pre-
vail in the possessory action, since title was not being tried.
41. 5 La. 132 (1833).
42. See McNeil v. Hicks, 34 La. Ann. 1090 (1882), which gave too broad
an interpretation to DeArmas with the result that It indicated that dedicated
lands were part of the private domain of the public.
43. The court gave a strict Interpretation of French law on the point
that only the king could charter a municipal corporation and grant it a pub-
lic domain. As a result the majority held that the city had acquired no title
under the old French law, and assuming it had, the sovereign had divested
it of title by a subsequent grant. The dissent pointed out that a modern
interpretation consistent with the Spanish law was that property could
19701
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Another force working toward displacement of the theory
that the public naturally had full title to public places was the
adoption of article 654 in the Louisiana Civil Code of 1825. This
article declared that servitudes of way imposed by law do not
deprive the landowner of his ownership of the soil underneath
the servient area. But the article used as an example the servi-
tude created by law in public roads, conveying the impression
that the soil under "public roads" belongs to individuals, and
the public "owns" only a servitude. Subsequent cases began to
demonstrate some confusion in the courts' decisions. Munici-
pality No. 2 v. Orleans Cotton Press,44 in speaking of an open
space on the original plan of the city of New Orleans, marked
"quai," between the front row of houses and the river, declared
that such a plan could have amounted to a "dedication to pub-
lic use" 5 had it been accepted. 4
For the next one hundred years the courts of Louisiana
vacillated between the older authority and the common law.
The common law's influence significantly increased during this
period. In City Council of Lafayette v. Holland 7 the court gave
effect to the original landowner's intention and found a dedica-
tion of streets to the public, even though the plat showed only
an "open space" between the street and the river. The court
expressly adopted the rule of the Cincinnati case that no par-
ticular form or ceremony is necessary to constitute a dedication,
although the context in which the principal case was decided
indicates that the court felt perfect ownership of the disputed
become public by grant, purchase, or prescription. The dissent felt that the
city had acquired title by dedication and such title could not be so easily
divested by the sovereign. While the majority rejected the Cincinnati case,
the dissent theorized that the case drew its basic logic from the maxims of
Corpus Juris Civilus: "Act honestly, keep promises made, and do not dis-
appoint expectations created." However, the dissent stated, somewhat con-
trary to the apparent reasoning of the Cincinnati case, that the right to use
public places results not from any supposed necessity that lot owners need
the streets (which would give rise to a servitude), but from the dedication
itself which designates these areas as public places (which grants title to the
public).
44. 18 La. 122 (1841).
45. The phrase "dedicated to public use" is a favorite expression of
common law writers, used when speaking of express common-law dedications
which convey only an easement or servitude to the public. See ELLoTT, RoADs
AND STREETS § 133.
46. This is the first mention of the requirement of acceptance by the
municipality. The court cites no particular authority for this additional
element, but it is probable that the Cincinnati case is responsible.
47. 18 La. 286 (1841).
[VOL. 30
1970] COMMENTS
area was in the public.48 Adding to the essential requirements of
a dedication was Linton v. Guillotte,49 wherein the court more
closely tracked the language of the Cincinnati case in stating
that the positive assent of the landowner is necessary to find
a dedication. Here, the court found that there was no positive
undertaking by the landowner to dedicate. 0 Common law dedi-
cation theories were further adopted in New Orleans & Carroll-
ton Railroad Co. v. Town of Carrollton,51 and the civil law doc-
trine of public places and dedication was greatly confused in
Hatch v. Arnault.52 The court in Hatch stated that not all roads
are "public highways" common to all, but some are "public
roads" from which one might infer that the public has only a
servitude since the court said that this latter type of roads
might be subject to private ownership and upon abandonment
the landowner may resume use of them.53
Following Hatch, the Louisiana Supreme Court seemed to
avoid defining the effects of a dedication,54 or it alternated
theories.55 In an unusual interlude of clarity, Saulet v. City of
48. Although the common law has since been settled that an express
common-law dedication, such as the situation where the landowner, In the
absence of a statute, plats a subdivision and sells lots accordingly, creates
only an easement or servitude, the Cincinnati case implied that title to dedi-
cated lands was held in abeyance until a municipal corporation capable of
accepting the dedication came into existence. Presumably, upon acceptance
title was supposed to have passed to the public. This implication was recog-
nized in the dissent in IDeArmas v. Mayor and City of New Orleans, 5 La.
132 (1833) and may have been of importance in deciding the Holland case.
49. 10 Rob. 357 (La. 1845).
50. The situation in Linton would probably be sufficient today to consti-
tute a statutory dedication under LA. R.S. 33:5051 (1962) were it not for the
unusual notoriety of the condition precedent attached by the owner to his
"offer" of dedication.
51. 3 La. Ann. 282 (1848). The court spoke of factors absent In this case
which would have supplied the elements of an estoppel in pais.
52. 3 La. Ann. 482 (1848).
53. The statement represented somewhat of a policy decision, apparently
based on article 654 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1825, and justified on the
grounds that while the Roman rule developed when roads were constructed
as permanently as man could make them, and only after acquisition of the
land by the public, the roads in a new and unsettled Louisiana were neces-
sarily temporary and subject to change. See 1 A. YIANNOPOULOS, CIvIL LAW Op
PROPERTY § 35 n.193 (1966).
54. See, e.g., Town of Carrollton v. Jones, 7 La. Ann. 233 (1852); Munici-
pality No. 2 v. Palfrey, 7 La. Ann. 497 (1852); Xiques v. Bujac, 7 La. Ann.
498 (1852).
55. Compare Burthe v. Blake, 9 La. Ann. 244 (1854), where the court
stated that the public right could not be violated, even though not needed by
the public, Indicating full ownership in the public; with Buisson v. McNeil,
9 La. Ann. 445 (1854), where the court found an intention by the landowner
to create a servitude.
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New Orleans56 reaffirmed the ownership theory of dedication,
but apparently based its decision on principles distilled from the
Cincinnati case. The court defined the public domain and the
private domain of the public57 and stated that only in relation to
the former type of property is there an exception dispensing
with the rules prevailing in private grants and supporting dedi-
cation for public use on the broad principles of equity which
have been considered sufficient to prevent a violation of good
faith to the public. On these principles, without grant or deed,
it must appear: (1) that the land has been used with the owner's
assent for public purposes, which, in their nature, exclude the
idea of private ownership, and for such a length of time that
public accommodation and private rights would be seriously
affected by the interruption of that use; or (2) that the intention
of the owner to appropriate the property to public purposes is
unequivocally manifested by some plan or writing so as to be
a violation of good faith to the public and those who have pur-
chased property according to such plan, if the owner revokes
the dedication. While the court recognized the ownership theory
under Louisiana law, the language used is drawn from the Cin-
cinnati case. The reasoning was quite clear, but not necessarily
consistent with the early Louisiana civil law of dedication.58
The grip of the Cincinnati case was strengthened in David &
Livaudais v. Municipality No. 2.59 The court recognized again the
ownership theory, but questioned whether a dedication could
transfer title to immovable property without the formalities
required by the Louisiana Civil Code. However, the court con-
sidered the matter settled by the "adoption" of the Cincinnati
rule in previous cases.60
For the next half-century, with the exception of City of
56. 10 La. Ann. 81 (1855).
57. See La. Civ. Code art. 449 (1825); 1 A. YIANNOPOULOS, CvWL LAW OF
PROPERTY § 30 (1966).
5& The underlying theory in the court's analysis seems to be estoppel,
while the early Louisiana civil law recognized title to dedicated lands in the
public because the dedication had designated the land as a "public place."
See DeArmas v. Mayor and City of New Orleans, 5 La. 132 (1833) (dissenting
opinion).
However, the case is quite consistent with the purely civilian principles
discussed In note 35 supra.
59. 14 La. Ann. 872 (1859).
60. The court somehow overlooked jurisprudence and cited Livaudais v.
Municipality No. 2, 16 La. 509 (1840), and Municipality No. 2 v. Orleans




Baton Rouge v. Bird l and City of Shreveport v. Walpole,62 Lou-
isiana courts clearly avoided deciding what was acquired by the
public by a dedication. 63 The Bird and Walpole cases use some
interesting terms, such as "out of commerce" and "inalienable,"
which would indicate that the idea of public ownership was still
valid in 1870.64 Unfortunately, some of the most oft-cited cases
in the Louisiana jurisprudence concerning dedication were de-
cided during this period, but none of these directly decided the
issue of ownership. Concluding this era of confusion was Flour-
noy v. Breard.6 5 The court recited the usual common law utter-
ances of estoppel applied to an owner who sells according to a
plan, but then added that the plat in this case was unambiguous
and showed no intention of retaining ownership over the streets.
The obvious implication is that perfect ownership of the streets
was vested in the public.66 How the court came to this conclu-
61. 21 La. Ann. 244 (1869).
62. 22 La. Ann. 526 (1870).
63. See, e.g., Calhoun v. Town of Colfax, 105 La. 416, 29 So. 887 (1901);
Lafitte v. City of New Orleans, 52 La. Ann. 2099, 28 So. 327 (1900); DeGrilleau
v. Frawley, 48 La. Ann. 184, 19 So. 151 (1896); Leland University v. City of
New Orleans, 47 La. Ann. 100, 16 So. 653 (1895); Land v. Smith, 44 La. Ann.
931, 11 So. 577 (1892); City of Shreveport v. Drouin, 41 La. Ann. 867, 6 So.
656 (1889); Heirs of Leonard v. City of Baton Rouge, 39 La. Ann. 275, 4 So.
241 (1887); Sheen v. Stothart, 29 La. Ann. 630 (1877); Arrowsmith v. City of
New Orleans, 24 La. Ann. 194 (1872); Pickett v. Brown, 18 La. Ann. 560
(1866); Burthe v. Fortier, 15 La. Ann. 9 (1860).
Burke v. Wall, 29 La. Ann. 38 (1877) and Sheen v. Stothart, 29 La. Ann.
630 (1877) are often cited for the proposition that a dedication conveys only
a servitude to the public. These cases actually deal with private rights cre-
ated between a subdivider and one of his purchasers.
64. These cases are actually more consistent with the purely civilian
principles mentioned in note 35 supra, but translated Into Louisiana legal
parlance, the quoted terms would suggest public ownership of the public
things involved.
65. 116 La. 230, 40 So. 684 (1906).
66. Several other cases decided about this time also used language which
tended to bolster the public ownership theory. Eggerson v. Livaudais, 6 Orl.
App. 417 (La. App. 1909), cert. denied, October 13, 1909, involved the narrow
issue of a pure donation of a cemetery and a road leading to it, but the court
spoke in terms of a grant and a dedication. Speaking generally on the sub-
ject of dedication, the court stated: "Dedication to public use, and servitudes
in favor of the public, are not regulated by the strict rules which govern pri-
vate property and transactions between individuals. The visible signs of
such dedication and open use of the property by the public afford ample
notice and protection to all, and supply the place of both title and registry"
(Emphasis added.). Id. at 419. The court, if correct in treating dedications
to public use and servitudes in favor of the public as two different things,
could have the key to harmonizing a great number of past cases. But see
note 45 supra.
Town of Vinton v. Lyons, 131 La. 673, 60 So. 54 (1912), spoke of a dedica-
tion as necessarily withdrawing dedicated lands from private use. City of
New Orleans v. Carrollton Land Co., 131 La. 1092, 60 So. 695 (1913) declared
that dedicated lands were "common and belonging to all," "out of commerce,"
and "inalienable."
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sion is rather mysterious, but Flournoy was of prime importance
in the problematical Banta decision.67
In 1896, the Louisiana legislature enacted a general statute"
relating to dedication which today forms the basis of statutory
dedication under R.S. 33:5051. The effect of this statute has
greatly increased recently, but it was occasionally overlooked
in the jurisprudence closely following its passage. One of several
notable cases ignoring Act 134 of 1896 was Iseringhausen v. Lar-
cade. 9 This case involved a plat made and recorded in 1913 by
which lots were sold to the parties. The court recited the rule
that a sale of lots with reference to a plan amounted to a dedi-
cation of the streets shown on the plan. Common law authority
was cited for the proposition that a grantee acquires a right of
way in such a situation. Absolutely no mention of the applica-
bility of Act i34 of 1896 was made by the court.
Unscathed by the language used in Iseringhausen, the Lou-
isiana Supreme Court decided what is probably the most em-
phatic declaration of allegiance to the public ownership theory
in Jaenke v. Taylor.70 This case involved the typical situation
of a recorded plan and a sale of lots in accordance therewith.
The issue was whether upon abandonment of a dedicated street
the burden of a servitude was simply removed from the estate
from which is was created, or whether the ownership in the
street accrued to each of the adjacent landowners up to the
center line under Act 151 of 1910.71 The court recited the Flour-
noy language that the plan showed no intention of the land-
owner to retain ownership of the streets, and concluded that:
"When MacFarlain . .. laid out the town . .. , [and] sold the
lots in accordance with his plan.. . , without any reservation or
restriction indicating an intention to retain the ownership of
the land covered by the streets . . . , he thereby irrevocably di-
67. For an interesting case suggestive of defenses to a claim of dedica-
tion in a Flournoy-type situation, see City of Alexandria v. Thigpen, 120 La.
294, 45 So. 253 (1907). The court indicated that where a subdivision plan
had been made, but not recorded, the sale of the whole subdivision by metes
and bounds did not effect a dedication of the streets shown on the plan, nor
did the sale of a single lot enclosed on all sides by other lots with no access
to any streets. Neither of these acts demonstrated an intention to dedicate
nor created a situation which required the application of the doctrine of
estoppel.
68. La. Acts 1896, No. 134.
69. 147 La. 515, 85 So. 224 (1920).
70. 160 La. 109, 106 So. 711 (1926).
71. Superseded by LA. R.S. 48:701 (1950).
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vested himself of the fee . . . ,"7 and, consequently, Act 151 of
1910 was found applicable. The most interesting fact concerning
this case is that it was not speaking of a statutory dedication
since the events constituting a dedication took place in 1884
before statutory dedication was possible.
In a changed context, additional confusion was created by
Metairie Park, Inc. v. Currie,7 8 construing Act 134 of 1896. The
court made a valuable contribution in holding that a substantial
compliance with the statute is sufficient to constitute a statutory
dedication since the only penalty for failure to comply is di-
rected at the landowner or his agent. The title to lots purchased
is not affected because the streets shown "become dedicated to
public use soon as a lot is sold in accordance with the plan.
Jaenke v. Taylor, 160 La. 109, 106 So. 711. ' '7 4 Why did the court
resort to Jaenke as authority when it did not involve statutory
dedication, but concerned formal non-statutory dedication com-
pleted before statutory dedication was made possible by the
legislature? Is it possible that the Jaenke theory was considered
as a legally permissible alternative for a failure to comply with
Act 134 of 1896? Such questions do not seem to have been seri-
ously considered on a comparative basis, although there con-
tinued to be inconsistent decisions.7 5
The foregoing is sufficient to demonstrate how the most
reasonable of men could become confused about the law of dedi-
cation. When the added element of Act 134 of 1896 began to
appear frequently, the need for an authoritative settling of the
72. Jaenke v. Taylor, 160 La. 109, 117, 106 So. 711, 714 (1925).
73. 168 La. 588, 122 So. 859 (1929).
74. Id. at 595, 122 So. at 862.
75. See, e.g., Jouett v. Keeney, 17 La. App. 323, 136 So. 175 (2d Cir. 1931),
where the court emphasized the "necessity" of acceptance of a dedication,
stating that it was an essential and indispensable element without which
dedications to public use remain inchoate; Wilkie v. Walmsley, 173 La. 141,
136 So. 296 (1931), declaring that where a grantor of land reserves in the
grant the return of the land when the public use ceases it is one thing, but
when he has made no such express reservation he parts absolutely with all
title to the land given to public use; Sliman v. Mayor and Board of Alder-
men of Village of Palmetto, 145 So. 410 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1933), involving a
statutory dedication which the court said transferred title to the streets to
the public but citing the Flournoy case; Faunce v. City of New Orleans, 148
So. 57 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1933), which is full of quotable quotes from the
common law, but which fails to decide what type of interest was conveyed
to the public by the dedication; and, finally, Kemp v. Town of Independence,
156 So. 56 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1934), stating that an 1871 plan amounted to a
dedication which divested the landowner of all title to the dedicated lands
and vested ownership in the public, a feature found by the court to be true
of all "public things," citing LA. CIV. CODs art. 454.
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law became irresistible. The result was the Parker case which,
as discussed above, only superficially achieved its goal. While
Parker purported to reduce dedications to only two basic cate-
gories, it did not mention the category of formal non-statutory
dedications. Admittedly, Parker is a strong force in the Louisi-
ana law of dedication, to the extent applicable, but it did not
serve to remove this third type of dedication from usage.
A feeble assault on the rigidity of the Parker case began al-
most immediately in another supreme court case decided in
1940, Richard v. City of New Orleans.7 6 There the court was
again faced with the commonly recurring factual situation of an
ancient plat of a subdivision showing streets, parks, alleys, and
other public places by which plan the original owner had sold
lots. The court found a completed dedication in 1828 and avoided
the question of the interest created by this formal, express type
of dedication by finding that the plaintiffs could not contest the
public character of the streets and their use. Obviously, in 1828,
a statutory dedication was impossible; likewise, there is more
involved in this factual situation than simply an informal
common-law dedication. However, the court did not really de-
cide what type of interest the public acquired in the dedicated
lands, but it hinted that perfect title to the land covered by the
streets was in the public. 7 The immediate consequence, which
does not seem to have disturbed any Louisiana court, was that
the supreme court expressly recognized a third type of dedica-
tion which Parker did not purport to cover.
The faith of the courts of appeal in Parker was not shaken
by Richard. Two cases immediately followed which recognized
the two exclusive methods of dedication as dictated by Parker.78
76. 195 La. 898, 197 So. 594 (1940).
77. The court recited the language of Flournoy that it was not the land-
owner's purpose to retain the fee title to the dedicated lands.
78. Life v. Griffith, 197 So. 646 (La. App, 2d Cir. 1940), cert. denied, July
30, 1940, involved a claim by the defendant that there had been no dedica-
tion, no acceptance, and no use of streets by a municipality, but the court
followed Parker to the letter finding a statutory dedication conveying per-
fect title to the public without need of acceptance.
In a somewhat questionable fact situation, Brasseaux v. Ducote, 6 So.2d
769 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1942) held that while there was not a statutory dedica-
tion, there was a common law offer of dedication which had not been
accepted by the public either formally or by use. The lower court's refusal
to admit as evidence plats made by original landowner prevented the occur-
rence of the identical fact situation involved in Richard. The court found
conclusive the testimony of the parish clerk that there were no maps on file
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A Richard-type factual situation was again raised in Esposito V.
Gaudet,79 but, like Richard, the context in which the issue of
public ownership was raised permitted the court to escape a
decision on the point. The suit involved only the necessity of
deciding whether a purchaser of land could recover the purchase
price for lack of a marketable title. Deciding in the purchaser's
favor, the court concluded that part of the land sold had been
previously dedicated; however, it was unnecessary to decide
whether this dedication was formal-statutory, informal-common-
law, or a third type. The common law authorities cited by the
court deal with express common-law dedications which would
create only a servitude in Louisiana."0 The Louisiana cases cited
as authority also avoided the issue of what type of interest was
created in the public, although they cited common law authori-
ties which would lead to the conclusion that only servitudes were
created."'
During the next five years no decisions were rendered which
struck at the validity of the Parker case.82 In 1947, an anachron-
ism was created by the Louisiana Supreme Court when it de-
cided James v. Delery.83 All that was sought by the plaintiff
was a right of way over streets within a subdivision in which
he was a lot owner. Though the facts justified a finding of stat-
utory dedication,84 the court stated that it was well established
of the town, but it does not explain how the plaintiff came to be owner of
"lot 7, square 26 of the Town of St. Francisville" without the existence of a
plan or map.
79. 8 So.2d 783 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1942).
80. See DILLON, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 1079; ELLIOTT, ROADS AND STREETS§ 133.
81. See Iseringhausen v. Larcade, 147 La. 515, 85 So. 224 (1920); Leland
University v. City of New Orleans, 47 La. Ann. 100, 16 So. 653 (1895); Faunce
v. City of New Orleans, 148 So. 157 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1933).
82. Three decisions were rendered between 1942 and 1947 which refined
some of the tangent areas in the creation of public interests in roads and
streets. Goree v. Midstates Oil Corp., 205 La. 988, 18 So.2d 591 (1944), makes
it clear that the public acquires only a servitude under the three-year main-
tenance provisions of LA. R.S. 48:491 (1950). Caz-Perk Realty, Inc. v. Police
Jury of East Baton Rouge Parish, 207 La. 796, 22 So.2d 121 (1945), indicated
that the local government has wide discretion in abandoning dedicated lands.
Bordelon v. Heard, 33 So.2d 88 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1947), dealt with the "tacit
dedication" under LA. R.S. 48:491 (1950), which conveys only a servitude to
the public and does not divest the landowner of title. Even these cases are
sometimes cited as holding that a non-statutory dedication creates only a
servitude. See, e.g., 1 A. YIANNOPOULOS, ClvL LAW OF PROPERTY § 35 n.188
(1966), citing Goree v. Midstates Oil Corp., 205 La. 988, 18 So.2d 591 (1944).
83. 211 La. 306, 29 So.2d 858 (1947).
84. In 1917, the landowner subdivided his land, filed a plat of the area,
and sold lots with reference to the plat. See Metairie Park, Inc. v. Currie,
168 La. 588, 122 So. 859 (1929).
1970]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 30
that when a landowner subdivides his land, creating streets,
etc., and then sells lots, he creates, by title, a servitude of pas-
sage over the streets.85 The plaintiff was accordingly adjudged
to have a right of way over the streets. The court felt that the
only contradiction in the jurisprudence on this issue was wheth-
er the servitude runs in favor of lot owners or the general pub-
lic.86
The James case appears to have been accepted without ques-
tion in the jurisprudence, and for another five years Parker was
cited approvingly and was further refined.87 One oft-cited case
purporting to bolster the authority of Parker is Collins v. Zan-
der,88 decided in 1952. The court in Collins reviewed the require-
ments of statutory and common-law dedications and found that
there had been a statutory dedication.8 9 In an effort to crystal-
lize dedications in Louisiana into either the statutory or common-
law variety (presumably excluding other possible classifica-
tions), the court digressed:
85. While it is true that the plaintiff was only seeking a servitude
of way, the court, by using such unqualified and authoritative language,
leaves the impression that regardless of who is entitled to the servitude,
the extent of the interest created was only a servitude.
86. While there is some confusion in the common law concerning
exactly when private rights of a grantee inure to the benefit of the public,
it Is somewhat of an understatement to say that this is the only point of
confusion in the jurisprudence. See DILLON, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS H 1071,
1083, 1090; ELLIOTT, ROADS AND STREETS § 132.
87. Martin v. Fuller, 214 La. 404, 37 So.2d 851 (1948) found a statutory
dedication, but announced that In order to affect the rights of third parties,
a dedication or revocation of a dedication must be recorded In accordance
with the laws of registry. Jeffries v. Police Jury of Rapides Parish, 53
So.2d 157 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1951) reiterated the principle that local authori-
ties have wide discretion In abandoning dedicated lands under LA. R.S.
48:701 (1950), which is the companion statute to the statutory dedication
provision, id. 33:5051.
88. 61 So.2d 897 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1952).
89. The court also decided two minor issues In the area of dedication
in dictum. First, the court hinted that although no provision for acceptance
is made in LA. R.S. 33:5051 (1962), still "the parish surveyor must acknowl-
edge his approval." Collins v. Zander, 61 So.2d 897, 899 (La. App. Orl. Cir.
1952). (It is questionable whether the mandatory interpretation given this
provision is correct. See Metairie Park, Inc. v. Currie, 168 La. 588, 122 So.
859 (1929).) Second, the court indicated that all that Is necessary to complete
a statutory dedication is recordation: "The dedication becomes complete
immediately upon the recordation of the plan or map and substantial
compliance with Act No. 134 of 1896 is all that is necessary to create a
valid statutory dedication." Id. at 899. This reasoning is consistent with the
idea that the elements of estoppel are not needed In a statutory dedication,
so the sale of lots does not become the critical requirement; however, it Is
questionable whether a statutory dedication might be found even without
a recordation, since other cases indicate that a failure to comply with
LA. R.S. 33:5051 (1962) subjects the landowner to a penalty, but does not
Invalidate the dedication. See Parish of Jefferson v. Doody, 247 La. 839,
174 So.2d 798 (1965).
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"Assuming arguendo . . .that the '15' lawn walk' was not
statutorily dedicated, then we are of the opinion that it
was impliedly dedicated. The principle is well established
in our jurisprudence that when the owner of a tract of land
subdivides it into lots and designates on the map or survey
of the subdivision streets, alleys, roads, walks, etc. and then
sells the property or any portion of it with references to
this plan or map, he effectively creates, by title, a servitude
of passage over the streets, alleys, roads, and walks, as re-
flected by the plan or map."90
This so-called principle is not clearly established by the juris-
prudence as illustrated by the previous discussion, but the court
was apparently making every effort to follow Parker exclusive-
ly. While it is suggested in commentary that Collins, by tracking
the language of Parker, thoroughly settled the law of dedication
in Louisiana, 91 the previous review of the jurisprudence indi-
cates that it should not be credited with such an effect. Cases
subsequent to Collins, from 1952 to 1967, seem to be consistent
with Parker,92 but the law of dedication in Louisiana, as re-
vealed in the Banta and Chevron cases, is not settled.
90. Collins v. Zander, 61 So.2d 897, 900 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1952).
91. See Comment, 16 LA. L. REv. 521 (1956).
92. Wilson Motor Co. v. McDonald, 69 So.2d 91 (La. App. 2d CMr. 1953),
cert. denied, Jan. 11, 1954, decided the problem of what to do with a
pre-existing road which was alluded to on a plat made by the subdividing
landowner. The court, consistently with Parker, decided that the owner
never intended to dedicate the soil underneath the road in this particular
fact situation; however, the court did find an implied dedication. It was
affirmatively decided for the first time by the Louisiana Supreme Court
that silence and inaction could serve as consent, which, if followed by
use, is sufficient to establish an implied dedication. B. F. Trappey's Son,
Inc. v. City of New Iberia, 225 La. 466, 73 So.2d 423 (1954). A good factual
illustration of the principle that Intention to dedicate must be clearly
established is found in Mecobon, Inc. v. Police Jury of Jefferson Parish,
224 La. 793, 70 So.2d 687 (1954), although the court cites as authority
Saulet v. City of New Orleans, 10 La. Ann. 81 (1855), which had nothing
to do with a statutory dedication. Johnston v. City of New Orleans, 234
La. 697, 101 So.2d 206 (1958) held that there need not be a municipal
corporation to accept a dedication since the public is an ever-existing
grantee capable of taking and enjoying a dedication. The court also
indicated that the grantor might make reservations in the dedication and
designation of a particular purpose, but it remains a question whether
such reservation could be made without offending LA. R.S. 33:5051 (1962).
The court did make it clear that in the case of a donation the donor can
attach conditions, the non-performance of which will justify rescission.
See Orleans Parish School Bd. v. Manson, 241 La. 1029, 132 So.2d 885 (1961).
A good discussion of substantial compliance with LA. R.S. 33:5051 (1962)
and its purposes was given in Parish of Jefferson v. Doody, 247 La. 839,
174 So.2d 798 (1965).
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The Civil Law and Louisiana-Dedication
The civil law notion of dedication in Louisiana, as evidenced
by the earlier cases, apparently consisted of two concepts: (1)
public things are owned by the public; and (2) one who desig-
nates as "public" does by that act of dedication alone create
public ownership of the designated lands.9 3 Underpinning these
objective rules of law is the same Roman principle which has
developed into the common law doctrine of estoppel: "Act
honestly, keep promises, do not disappoint expectations created
in other men. ' 94 Louisiana apparently honored these principles
until the time of the Cincinnati case, 95 but the jurisprudence
subsequently faltered until Parker adopted completely the com-
mon law principles of dedication. A close reading of the Lou-
isiana cases will reveal that the language of the common law
writers has been taken out of context and used to support dedi-
cations in Louisiana.9 6 The best example of error is found in
Parker itself which is supposedly the fountainhead of authority
on the Louisiana law of dedication. The Parker case cites Jaenke
v. Taylor97 as authority for the proposition that a statutory dedi-
cation divests the landowner of his ownership and conveys it to
the public. In its next breath the court distinguishes Jaenke from
the situation under consideration because it involved a common-
law dedication. As discussed above, Jaenke involved neither a
formal statutory dedication nor an informal common-law dedi-
cation, but a formal, non-statutory type of dedication. The defini-
tions given implied common-law dedications and statutory dedi-
cations in the Parker case would exclude both theories as a
ratio decidendi for the Jaenke situation which involved a dedi-
cation before Act 134 of 1896 and expressly recognized that full
title was conveyed to the public.
Other examples of inconsistencies have been noted above,
and it seems fair to say that Louisiana courts have been only
fair-weather friends to the Louisiana civil law principles of dedi-
93. See DeArmas v. Mayor and City of New Orleans, 5 La. 132 (1833)
(dissenting opinion). Cf. note 35 supra.
94. Id.
95. See Mayor and City of New Orleans v. Gravier, 11 Mart.(O.S.) 620
(La. 1822) and the Spanish opinion there discussed; Renthrop v. Bourg,
4 Mart.(O.S.) 97 (La. 1816); Mayor and City of New Orleans v. Metzinger,
3 Mart.(O.S.) 296 (La. 1814).
96. See, e.g., Richard v. City of New Orleans, 195 La. 898, 197 So. 594
(1940); Esposito v. Gaudet, 8 So.2d 783 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1942).
97. 160 La. 109, 106 So. 711 (1926).
[VOL. 30
COMMENTS
cation. They have been used, with varying common law modifica-
tions, only when the courts could not avoid deciding the issue
of public ownership or when the rigid twofold forms of Parker
could not be utilized.
The Parker case, while broadly worded, was a practical
decision in that it covered the bulk of the problems in the law
of dedication. Act 134 of 1896, now R.S. 33:5051, covers virtually
all modern cases of subdivision; and the notion of implied dedi-
cations, although somewhat foreign to Louisiana civilian prin-
ciples, appear to be a concept pragmatically developed in an
absence of directly applicable legislation. What the Louisiana
cases, especially Parker, with its tone of exclusiveness, have
failed to do is to take into consideration and clearly distinguish
between the various situations in which dedication questions
can arise. A helpful suggestion from the common law is to recog-
nize three basic factual situations involved in dedications: (1)
formal, statutory dedication-where there is an applicable sta-
tute; (2) informal dedication-where there is only an implied
intention to dedicate; (3) formal, non-statutory dedication-
where there is an express intention to dedicate but no statute
is applicable.
The first category is relatively simple, involving only sub-
stantial compliance with R.S. 33:5051. The minimal require-
ments of the substantial compliance doctrine are certainly neces-
sary to accomplish the objectives of the statute and simplify the
task of the title examiner.98 While the proposition that R.S.33:-
5051 works a conveyance of full ownership of dedicated lands to
the public does not appear to be particularly necessary,99 it is
consistent with established Louisiana law principles that "public
things" are not subject to private ownership and are out of
commerce.10 0
The second category would involve the various forms of
dedication in which the law deems it necessary to infer an in-
tent to dedicate from the landowner's actions and to estop him
from denying the right of the public to use such dedicated areas.
98. See Parish of Jefferson v. Doody, 247 La. 839, 174 So.2d 798 (1965);
Metairie Park, Inc. v. Currie, 168 La. 588, 122 So. 859 (1929).
99. See Louisiana Highway Comm'n v. Raxsdale, 12 So.2d 631 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1943), holding that property rights, including servitudes, owned
by a municipal corporation which pertain to public places are inalienable
and not subject to prescription.
100. See note 95 supra. Cf. note 35 supra.
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Implied dedications by individuals to the public seem to be a
relatively new area in Louisiana law. While the ancient civil
law could be adapted to this situation by recognition of a right
of use in the public, it would be confusing to revive these prin-
ciples of law concerning public things after they have been used
in a modified fashion for so long. 101 There would seem to be
no objection to using the common law in this area, with its
modifications, such as the necessity of acceptance and the result
that only a servitude is conveyed to the public, since the result
is the same as would have been reached under the ancient civil
law; and a complete change of theory is avoided. Attempting to
justify a conveyance of perfect title through an implied dedi-
cation to the public could run afoul of basic due process 10 2 and
the maxim that no one is presumed to give away his property.
It is questionable whether implied intent could take the place
of an express grant to the public.103 A servitude would be suf-
ficient for the public's needs 10 4 without offending any true civil
law traditions. The requirement of acceptance of such a dedica-
tion would not prejudice private rights which can be created
and sustained independent of the public's rights. 0 5
The third category deals with the situation in which the
statute is not substantially complied with or is wholly inap-
plicable, as in Banta. This category would encompass the com-
monly occurring situation in which a landowner has subdivided
and platted his land and sold lots with reference to it. Such
formal, express dedications, not of statutory character, should
be handled as they have been intermittently throughout the
Louisiana jurisprudence. On the basis of established Louisiana
civil law principles, 0 6 lands designated as public places should
become out of commerce and title to such lands should be in
the public. These express dedications should be sustained when-
ever the landowner does some affirmative, express act which
101. It is not probable that LA. CIv. CODE art. 658, introduced as La.
Civ. Code art. 654 (1825), was intended to bear on the question of dedica-
tion. It is more probable that the example of public roads given was meant
to direct attention to servitudes imposed by law, such as the river road
servitude. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 705, 707. See also note 35 supra.
102. See LA. CONST. art. I, § 2.
103. See note 107 infra.
104. See note 98 supra.
105. See James v. Delery, 211 La. 306, 29 So.2d 858 (1947); DeGrilleau v.
Frawley, 48 La. Ann. 190, 19 So. 151 (1896); Burke v. Wall, 29 La. Ann. 38
(1877); Buisson v. McNeil, 9 La. Ann. 445 (1854); Xiques v. Bujac, 7 La.
Aknn. 498 (1852).
106. See note 95 supra. Cf. note 35 supra.
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clearly shows an intention to dedicate, since the policy favoring
grants to the public dispenses with the ordinary rules of con-
veyance, and the formality of the dedication should suffice to
convey perfect title to the public.107 Since such a dedication is
similar to a grant to the general public, there should be no re-
quirement of acceptance.
Conclusion
With the above analysis in mind, it would seem that the
Banta case is correct, and the Chevron case is sustainable on the
theory that it amounted to a formal, non-statutory dedication.
Banta did realize the existence of this third type of dedication in
the jurisprudence, but even the older authority cited by the
court had been somewhat diluted by the common law. There is
no objection to relying on common law precedents when deal-
ing with a statutory or implied dedication since neither type
reaches results materially opposed to principles of the civil law.
But by a return to the principles of Louisiana civil law and a
recognition that a complete adoption of the common law is not
necessary in the limited third area of formal, non-statutory dedi-
cations, the Louisiana courts in the future could begin a con-
sistent line of jurisprudence decided on principles which rep-
resent the best of both worlds.
Michael G. Page
THE FICTITIOUS COMMUNITY AND THE
RIGHT TO PARTITION
Introduction
The Louisiana Civil Code provides that a community of
acquets and gains arises from every marriage contracted in this
state, unless the parties agree before marriage to a contrary
stipulation.1 The community is terminated when the bonds of
matrimony are dissolved2 or when there is a separation of prop-
erty3 or a separation from bed and board.4 Upon the dissolution
107. See Eggerson v. Livaudais, 6 Orl. App. 417 (La. 1909); City of
Baton Rouge v. Bird, 21 La. Ann. 244 (1869); Saulet v. City of New Orleans,
10 La. Ann. 81 (1855); DeArmas v. Mayor and City of New Orleans, 5 La.
132 (1833) (dissenting opinion).
1. LA. Cxv. CODE arts. 2392, 2399, 2424.
2. Id. arts. 136, 2405.
3. See id. arts. 2425, 2430.
4. Id. art. 155.
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